The purpose of thjs study was to revisit one of the 
The summ er of 2012 ma¡ked the 40th anniversary of the passage of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, an act that ba¡s sex discrimination in U.S. schools receiving federal financial support (Fagan & Cyphers, 2012) . During the past four decades, Title lX's impact in the area of school sport programs has been controversial and contested (McAndrews, 2012; Pemberton, 2012 Walton & Helstein, 2008 . rtr/hile Title D( has been credited with fostering unprecedented growth in opporrunities for female athletes, it has also been blamed for harming the prospects for male athletes through program cuts (Glover, 2011; Langton, 2009) . Despite the work of scholars and Title IX activists to demonstrate that cuts in men's programs are often wrongly attributed to Title IX, a perception that gains in women's sport have come at the expense of men endures (Cheslock, 2007 (Cheslock, ,2008  Staurowsþ,2011) .
This palpable sense that Title D( has promoted an injustice against men is stirred each time school officials eliminate men's sport and invoke Title IX requirements as a cause for those decisions. At the college and university level, the cases have become symbols of federal government intrusion into the educatìonal system that The aurhors are wirh lhe Departrnent of Sport Management, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA has produced the "unintended consequence" of limiting opportunities for male students through the application of an "illegal" quota system (Ridpath, Yiamouyi- annis, Lawrence & Galles, 2008; Samuels & Galles, 2003) .
Since the 1990s, court cases filed by male athlete plaintiffs alleging ha¡ms done as a result of Title IX's application to athletic departments have all failed. Nine federal courts have determined that Title IX's enforcement scheme is not a quota system (National Women's Law Center,2011) . As a matter of individual institutional autonomy, schools may exercise the right to determine how funding is going to be allocated and in what areas as long as those allocations are done in a gender equitable fashion (National Women's Law Center,2012) .
Despite the controversy that occurs in the immediate aftermath of a college and university announcing program cuts (Lukas,2012) , very little attention is paid to what happens within an athletic department after cuts are made. The purpose of this study was to revisit one of the most highly publicized cases alleging Title IX harmed male athletes at James Madison University (JMU) following a decision that cuts would be made to the athletic program in 2006. This case was chosen because JMU officials represented the decision to cut programs as motivated by Title IX while selectively failing to disclose that during the same period, greater institutional resources were being devoted to the footballþrogram in preparation for playing in a more competitive conference (Lopiano, October 6,2006; Staurowsky, 2006 Staurowsky, ,2007 Title D(, passed in 1972 as a component of omnibus legislation addressing education reform, which was signed into law by President Richard M. Nixon (Carpenter & Acosta, 2004; Hogshead-Makar & Zimbalist, 2007; Sack & Staurowsky, 1997; -Ware, 2011 ). In the years following its passage, the statute's application to athletic departments has been implemented by the Department of Education (and its predecessor, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare) through regulations, interpretations, letters of clarification, and court opinions (Bonnette, 20}4; Carpenter & Acosta, 2004; Hogshead-Makar & Zimbalist, 2007) .
Title IX's enforcement scheme is anchored in regulations promulgated in 1975 requiring educational institutions to offer female and male athletes equal access to athletic opportunities, access to athletically-related financial aid proportional to participation, and access to equitable benefits accorded athletes in operational areas that support performance and experience (Title IX regulation, 1975 (Cantu, 1996) . Substantial proportionality is achieved when the gender ratios in the athletic department mirror those of students in the general student population. Importantly, the 1996 clarification ìssued by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) focuses nor on percentages per se but on what those percentages mean (Cantu, 1996) (Ali, 2010 (Ali, : cantu, 1996 Reynolds, 2003 (Reynolds, 2003, n.p.) (Steinbach, 2000) . Over time, a strategy designed to increase opportunities for female athletes while not adding women's teams led to several uùùr.s. One was the creation of "ghost participation slots," meaning school officials were reporting hypothetical squad sizes that exceeded the actual number of women competing on teams (Lopiano, 20II (Biediger v. Quinnipiac,2009; . Female cross country runners were requirèd to participate on the indoor and outdoor track teams so they could be counted three times in the proportionality calculation. The court determined the "principal role" of those athletes was "to provide a gender statistic rather than a meaningful contribution to the team" resulting in a ratio of female athlete participation compared with the general female student population that was illusory (Biediger v. Quinnlpiac,2009, p. 35) . In August of 2012, the u.S. court of Appeals for the Seãond Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that Qunnìpiac discriminated against female athletes on their campus (Biediger v. Quinnipiac,2012) .
A NewYorkTimes investigation into roster management practices revealed that schools engage in a variety of strategies that result in proportionality ratios appearing be6er tha¡ what they are in reality (Thomas, 2011) . Detecting that something might not be quite right with the numbers, Thomas found some institutions were counting male piactice players as female athletes; female athletes were being required to compete on multiple teams; and some female athletes listed on team rosters were not members of those teams. Identifying the importance of pursuing "red flags" that signal potential Title IX violations, Lopiano (2011) just about no way we could add more women's progr¿uns and afford it and be in compliance" (Redden, 2006) . Immediately after the announcement, some of the affected athletes and their allies mobilized on campus to voice their opposition (Goldenbach, 2006 : Lemke, 2006 McCarthy, 2006; Pennington,2006 Pennington, ,2007 Specifically the institution could have offered more sports for women.In addition, thì cutting of women's programs as part of the plan to achieve compliance exacerbated the problem by violating the second and third part of the test. An institution can neithei argue it has a history and continuing practice of program expansion nor it is fully accommodating the interests and abilities of female athletes after cutting existing programs (Cantu, t996; CarPenter & Acosta, 2004) .
According to JMU officials, alternatives underTitle D( to expand the women's program rather than cut teams were not viable because of the debt that would have ãccómpanied those additions (King,2006) . Significantly, the institution's tolerance for theãssumption of debt for the athletic department varied depending on the sport (Staurowsþ ,2006 (Staurowsþ , ,2007 (Staurowsþ , ,2011 while JMU's decision to cul programs had the potential to respond to some of Title IX's requirements, football's strategic absence from the rationaìe prevented an understanding the athletic department was repositioning to respond to a more competitive enviìonment (Staurowsky, 2006 (Staurowsky, , 2007 (Staurowsky, ,2011 Table 2 ).In terms of actual number of Table 8 ). While 56Vo of the overall allocation of salary dollars for head coaches was directed to women's programs, coaches of women's teams earned on average 367o less than the head coaches of the men's teams. And despite the fact there were fewer male athletes in the program (261 male athletes compared with 336 female athletes), there was a larger number of assistant coaches devoted to male teams (see Table 9 ). As a result, more than 60Vo of assistant coach salaries was used to pay assistant Table 6 Due to the lack of specificity and detail in the EADA reporting mechanism, it is not possible to discern with confidence whether the overall athletic program is breaking even, profitable, or operating at a deficit. There are several reasons for this.
According to the 20rG¡20ll EADA report, both the overall men's and women's programs appear to have made more in revenue than what was expended. However, in the budget category listed as "not allocated by gender" there is a $34,847 shortfall, a shortfall that matches identically rhe $34,847 "profit" reported for the men's and women's teams. It is difficult to reconcile those budget lines and whether there is something there to be examined further.
Second, the issue of the term "revenue" also requires further consideration. "Revenue" within the context of an EADA report merely refers to the budget available for an athletic department in any given reporting year. The U. S. Department of Education defines revenue for the purposes of the EADA as 'All revenues attributable to intercollegiate athletic activities. This includes revenues from appearance guarantees and options, contributions from alumni and others, institutional royalties, signage and other sponsorships, sport camps, state or other government support, student activity fees, ticket and luxury box sales, and any other revenues attributable to intercollegiate athletic activities" (Equity in Athletics, 2012).t6 While the EADA recognizes the various revenue streams that may c'ontribute to an athletic budget, the report itself does not offer insight into where tbe money comes from to run athletics programs. According to state audit reports for the JMU intercollegiate athletic department, the primary revenue streâm for its athletic departmenrbudgetis a mandated student fee thatpays forov-e¡ 807o of JMU athletes (Jámes Madisoñ University intercollegiate athletics. . . , 2005; 2006; 2007:,2008; 2009;2010; 2011) . Ln200Ç2007, the athletic department relied on student fees for 86.ZVo of its budget. By 20lG-2011, the overall contribution from student fees had been reduced to83Vo.t1Five years after the cuts to the athletic department were made, the amount of money contributed by student fees to the athletic department budget, which was $25,704,568 in 201G-2011, surpassed the entire 200Ç2007 athlãtic budget. An understanding of this language is important in assessing the true nature of the JMU athletic department and who it serves. As Table l0 demonstrates, this particular athletic department was heavily subsidized by students befo¡e the program cuts were made to the athletic department. It continues in the aftermath of those cuts to be heavily subsidized by students' Table 10 (Sperber, 2000; Weaver, 2010) , where schools with limited resources attempt to chase the dream of big-time football, the decisions at JMU suggest that the institution made a calculated gamble in terms of whether a highly competitive football team will deliver a measure of public exposure and return on investment that makes all of this worthwhile. re The expansion of the athletic complex speaks to the presence of the arms race in intercollegiate athletics, where the philosophy of "it takes money to make money" has been used to justify putting more and more resources into football and men's ,l basketball (Weiner, 2009 (King, 2012, p.29 ).
An express objective to maximize athletic revenues is expected to occur through ticket salei and marketing. "By providing a top level game day experience in conjunction with a well planned marketing effort, Athletics will realize revenues in ã*.".r of budgets and participants (fans, students & athletes) will garner memorable JMU experiences" (King, p. 30 (NCAA Accumulated Attendance Report, 2012) .
In the faJl of 2012. JMU played V/estVirginia, ranked eighth in the FBS in the preseason, at FedEx Field in Landover, Maryland (Sch-labach ,2012) . WestVirginia àarned a guarantee of $2.3 million. JMU's projected share was a minimum of $350,000 (Dunleavy, 2Ol2) , an amount that surpassed their entire football budget of $201,263 in 2001 (Fairbank, 2011).20 And while a payday of that kind is evidence that JMU has positioned itself to make money off of its football program, it remains to be seen if the effort will result in the program paying for itself. As noted earlier, the entire athletic program, including football, continues to be subsidized heavily with student fees.
Fúrther, to sustain the business that is now JMU athletics, the number of employees within the athletic department has grown and their roles and functions havì expanded to match the demands of the enterprise. As a consequence, coaches are no iong"r the largest number of employees in this or many other athletic departmenrs. For the 2010-2011 academic year, IMU has a professional staff of SOworking in a range of offices and areas including athletics administration (5), the business office (4), compliance (3), development (8), equipment management (5), facilities (9), human resources (l), marketing (6), athletics communicalions (8), sports medicine (ll), sport psychology (2), strength and conditioning (7), student-athlete services (8), and tickets and customer relations (3) supported by a staffof l8 executive assistants, adminiscrative assistants, and office managers (IMU StaffDirectory,2012 -2013 
